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Grandparent Visitation
Legislation: The Controversy
Didn't Begin or End with
Troxel v. Granville
The Supreme Court case Troxel v.
Granville assured the states the defini-
tive say in grandparents' visitation
rights. It also endorsed the traditional
right of the parent or parents to decide
who their children visit. What paths
will the state courts take? This article
reviews state statutes and decisions for
the winning arguments that might
influence courts in the future.
By Randall E. Doyle
Randall E. Doyle is a graduate of Marquette
University Law School. He is an associate at
Rasmussen Law Offices in Beaver Dam, Wisconsin.
He received a Bachelor of Arts with honors from the
University of Memphis.
n the not-too-distant past, the concept of vis-
itation with a minor child was governed only
by common-law principles. 1 One of the hall-
marks of these principles was that no one,
including grandparents, had any legal right to
visit with an intact family's children if the child's
parents forbade the visitation.2
In some jurisdictions this principle was expand-
ed to include non-intact families as well; as one
court phrased it: "[t]he right to determine the third
parties who are to share in the custody and influ-
ence of and participate in the visitation privileges
with the children should vest primarily with the
parent who is charged with the daily responsibility
of rearing the children." 3
The reasoning behind the courts' reluctance to
involve themselves in familial disputes is sound.
Generally, they believe that "any interference with
parental decision-making would undermine
parental authority and impede parents from
accomplishing the legal and moral duties imposed
by society." 4 In addition, they recognize that courts
simply are not structured for effective resolution of
intergenerational familial disputes. 5
In the 1960s American societal demographics
began to shift. One aspect of the changes was that
the average life expectancy increased. The number
of people aged sixty-five and older dramatically
rose, and will continue to rise over the next few
33
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decades. 6 In addition, Americans are retiring earli-
er and wealthier.7 This last fact has led to the older
generation having more resources and time to
actively involve themselves in the lives of their
adult children and grandchildren. 8 Also, the older
generation has become increasingly politically
active in an attempt to safeguard its interests.9 This
activism ultimately led to the passage of grandpar-
ent visitation legislation in all fifty states. 10
Setting the Stage for Troxel v. Granville:
Constitutional Challenges to Grandparent
Visitation Legislation
The passage of legislation by the states did not
put an end to the issue of grandparents' visitation
rights. Rather, the passage of grandparent visita-
tion legislation led to questions concerning
parental autonomy and the constitutionality of
the statutes. 11 Prior to June 5, 2000, when the
United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Troxel v. Granville, litigation of the
issue of parental autonomy had caused six states
to declare their grandparent visitation statutes
unconstitutional. 12
Although the state of Tennessee was not the
first state to address the constitutionality of
grandparent visitation legislation, 13 it was the
first state to strike down a statute as unconstitu-
tional. In Hawk v. Hawk, the Tennessee Supreme
Court held that the state's Grandparents'
Visitation Act1 4 interfered with fundamental lib-
erty interests that had been identified as far back
as Meyer v. Nebraska15 and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters1 6 by the United States Supreme Court. 17
The Tennessee court focused on the fact that the
statute only required a trial court to find that vis-
itation would be in the best interests of the child
while not requiring the court to articulate any
reason for disregarding the judgment of the par-
ent. 18 In striking down the statute as written,
they found that a trial court should grant visita-
tion only upon a showing that the denial of such
would harm or potentially harm the child. 19
The Supreme Court of Georgia followed
Tennessee two years later in Brooks v. Parkerson.
In Brooks the court declared the Georgia statute
unconstitutional under both the U.S. and Georgia
Constitutions. 20 The court said that, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the right to raise a child
without governmental interference was a funda-
mental liberty interest. 21 The statute was uncon-
stitutional because it did not clearly promote the
health or welfare of the child and did not require
a showing of harm to the child before state inter-
ference was authorized. 22
In Beagle v. Beagle the Florida Supreme Court
interpreted the Florida Constitution to afford
greater privacy protection than the Federal
Constitution.2 3 Thus, there must be a compelling
state interest to infringe upon parents' funda-
mental privacy rights in the rearing of their chil-
dren. 2 4 Agreeing with Tennessee and Georgia,
the court held that without a finding of harm or
potential harm to the child, there could be no
compelling state interest and therefore the statute
was facially flawed. 2 5
In In re Herbst the Oklahoma Supreme Court
adopted the "harm to the child" standard while
also requiring a showing of parental unfitness
before visitation could be awarded to the peti-
tioning grandparents. 2 6 The court wrote that "a
vague generalization about the positive influence
many grandparents have upon their grandchil-
dren falls far short of the necessary showing of
harm which would warrant the state's interfer-
ence with [the] parental decision regarding who
may see a child." 27 While petitioner argued that
the case was ultimately about the best interests of
the child, the court rejected this argument.2 8 It
said that to reach the question of the child's best
interests there must first be a threshold showing
of harm or threat of harm to the child. 29 Thus,
the statute as written could not pass constitu-
tional analysis. 3 0
However, the North Dakota Supreme Court
chose not to adopt the "harm to the child" stan-
dard when it rendered its decision in Hoff v.
Berg.3 1 Instead, the court held that, under a strict
scrutiny standard, the statute in question was not
narrow enough.32 The state was unable to make
a compelling argument to justify any presump-
tion that grandparent visitation was in the best
interests of the child. 33 The court said that since
there was no compelling argument justifying such
a burden upon parents' fundamental rights the
statute must fail strict constitutional scrutiny.34
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Troxel v. Granville
The Case Works Its Way
Toward the U.S. Supreme Court
Respondent Tommie Granville was the mother of
two daughters, Natalie and Isabelle, born to the
son of the Petitioners, Gary and Jenifer Troxel. 35
The Troxels had maintained contact with their
grandchildren after their son Brad committed sui-
cide in 1993.36
Eventually, a dispute arose between the Troxels
and Granville regarding the frequency of the visits.37
The Troxels brought suit and requested visitation of
two overnight weekends a month and two weeks
during the summer.38 Granville, however, did not
completely oppose the idea of visitation and instead
requested the trial court to limit it to one weekend a
month with no overnight stay.39 After a remand, the
trial court determined that the Troxels were to
receive visitation for one weekend a month, one
week during the summer and for four hours on each
of the Troxel's birthdays. 40 The court said its deci-
sion regarding visitation was based on the best inter-
ests of the child. 41
Granville appealed and the Washington Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. 42 The
appellate court did not reach the constitutional
question, instead basing its decision on the issue of
standing.4 3 The appellate court wrote that unless
there was an underlying custody action pending, a
third party would not have standing to petition for
visitation.44
The Troxels then appealed the decision to the
Washington Supreme Court, which granted the peti-
tion for review and consolidated it with two other
cases. 45 The state supreme court disagreed with the
appellate court on the issue of standing, finding that
the plain language of the statute afforded standing
regardless of the whether there was an underlying
custody action. 46 However, the Washington
Supreme Court reached the same conclusion as the
Court of Appeals and upheld reversal of the trial
court's order.47 The Washington Supreme Court
based its decision upon the Federal Constitution and
the fundamental privacy right of parents to raise
their children.48
According to the court, there were two basic
problems with the statute. 49 First, it failed to
afford the proper amount of constitutional protec-
tion to the parents because it did not require a peti-
tioner to make a threshold showing of harm to the
child.50 The threshold showing was necessary to
rebut the presumption that a fit parent always
acted in the best interests of the child.5 1 Second,
the court found the statute was too broad, as it
allowed "any person" to petition for visitation at
"any time" with the only requirement for granting
of the requested visitation being the best interests
of the child.5 2 The court stated that no judges
should be able to substitute their judgment for that
of the parents just because they felt they could
make a "better" decision.5 3 In addition, "the par-
ents should be the ones to choose whether to
expose their children to certain people or ideas." 54
The Troxels appealed the decision to the United
States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. 55
The United States Supreme Court Considers
Washington's Grandparent Visitation
Statute
In the plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor returned
to the substantive due process decisions that had
been articulated in the Meyer and Pierce cases and
that allowed parents the right to be free from state
interference regarding the care, custody, and con-
trol of their children.56 The plurality determined
that the Washington statute erred in placing the
determination of the best interests of the child in
the hands of a judge and not with the parent. 57
Applying the proper legal standard to the facts
of the case, Justice O'Connor found three basic fac-
tors that caused the trial court's order to violate
Granville's constitutional rights. First, there were
no allegations or proof that Granville was an unfit
parent. 58 In the absence of such proof there is a
presumption that the parent is acting in the best
interests of the child and thus a court should give
proper weight to the parent's wishes.5 9 Second, not
only did the trial court fail to acknowledge the pre-
sumption in favor of the parents but it based its
decision on the presumption that, without evidence
to the contrary, grandparent visitation is in the best
interests of the child.60 Finally, the Court noted
that there were no allegations that Granville was
attempting to deny visitation to the Troxels unilat-
erally.6 1 Indeed, there was evidence to the con-
trary: Granville was willing to allow continued vis-
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itation but wanted the amount restricted. 62
The Court's plurality determined that, based on
these three factors, Granville's due process rights
had been violated by the visitation order issued by
the trial court. 63
However, there are also some considerations
that the Court did not determine. The Court did
not go as far as the Washington Supreme Court by
adopting the "harm to the child" standard. 64 But
the standard was not rejected either.65 Rather, the
plurality only criticized the statute for allowing a
judge to substitute his or her judgment for that of
the parent,66 and stated that a trial judge must give
special weight to a fit parent's wishes. 67 The plu-
rality chose not to incorporate the special weight
provision into a standard that would automatical-
ly guarantee a parent's constitutional rights.6 8
Two justices concurred in the result, but stated
that they would have found the statute unconstitu-
tional on its face. 69 Justice Souter found the statute
facially overbroad in that it allowed "any person"
to petition the courts "at any time." 70 Justice
Thomas also wrote separately, saying that he
agreed with the plurality's ultimate determination
but criticized them for not applying a strict scruti-
ny standard.7 1
The Effect of Troxel v. Granville
On Grandparent Visitation Legislation
Prior to the Troxel decision, six states had invali-
dated their grandparent visitation statutes. In the
wake of the Troxel decision, however, only two
states have declared their grandparent visitation
legislation to be facially unconstitutional. 72
In Santi v. Santi the Supreme Court of Iowa applied
the strict scrutiny standard required for fundamental
liberty interests. 73 The court noted that "[c]onspicu-
ously absent from the statute is any rationale-com-
pelling or otherwise-for.. .court-ordered intrusion
on parental decision-making. "74 Without a threshold
requirement of parental unfitness "the statute effec-
tively substitutes sentimentality for constitutionali-
ty." 75 The court determined that under the Iowa
Constitution the statute was facially unconstitutional
because it permitted "state intrusion on fit parents'
fundamental liberty interest in childrearing." 76
In Derose v. Derose the Michigan Court of
Appeals struck down the Michigan visitation
statute because it lacked any standards beyond the
"best interests of the child."77 Specifically, citing
Troxel, the court noted that the statute at issue suf-
fered from the same infirmity as the Washington
statute.78 The court declined to interpret the statute
in a manner that would be constitutional, noting
that such an endeavor "would require a significant,
substantive rewriting of the statute."79 In striking
down the statute the court stated that such a task is
better left to the legislature than the judiciary.80
However, at least one court has chosen to inter-
pret its grandparent visitation statute in a manner
that saves it. 8 1 In Patricia C. v. Virginia 0. the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals noted that the statute
did not articulate a presumption in favor of a fit
parent's decision. 82 Looking to the Troxel decision,
the court determined that Troxel "strongly sug-
gested" that a presumption in favor of the parent's
wishes could be read into a statute to save it from
facial unconstitutionality.8 3 The court then held
that such a presumption must be applied by
Wisconsin circuit courts when making a grandpar-
ent visitation determination. 84
Also, it should be noted that many states, while
refusing to declare their grandparent visitation
statutes facially unconstitutional, have ruled that
their grandparent visitation statutes were unconsti-
tutional as applied in the specific case. The
California Court of Appeals, in Punsly v. Ho, held
that the application of the California visitation
statute infringed on a fit mother's fundamental
rights when the trial court applied a presumption
in favor of grandparental visitation and awarded
the visitation over her objection.85 In addition, the
mother did not oppose some visitation. 86 In Roth
v. Weston, the Connecticut Supreme Court held
that visitation could not be ordered against a
father's wishes when the father was not shown to
be unfit, there was no showing of harm to the child
if visitation were denied, and the petitioners did
not have a parent-like relationship with the child.87
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Lulay v. Lulay,
found that there was no compelling state interest in
forcing fit, divorced parents to give visitation to
grandparents over their objection.88 The Indiana
Court of Appeals found their statute constitution-
al, but found that it had been applied unconstitu-
tionally when the trial court did not give a pre-
sumption in favor of a fit mother's objection to vis-
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itation in Crafton v. Gibson.89 In a case factually
similar to the Troxel decision, the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals, in Brice v. Brice, held the state's
visitation statute unconstitutional as applied when
there was no showing of parental unfitness and the
mother was not opposed to a limited amount of
visitation.90 In the New Jersey case of Wilde v.
Wilde, the state Supreme Court found its statute
unconstitutional as applied when it was used to
force a newly widowed mother into mediation
soon after her husband's suicide and without any
showing of the mother's unfitness. 91
Finally, many states have found their visitation
statutes were constitutional, in both pre- and post-
Troxel decisions. The Maine Supreme Court, in
Rideout v. Riendeau, held that there was a com-
pelling state interest present when a parent-child
relationship existed between the grandparents and
the child and overturned the lower court's finding
of unconstitutionality. 92 In Stacy v. Ross, the
Mississippi high court held their Grandparent
Visitation Act did not violate due process because
visitation could be awarded only in limited circum-
stances that did not interfere with parents' funda-
mental rights. 93
In a post-Troxel decision, the New York
Appellate Division held that Troxel did not call for
a per se invalidation of the New York visitation
statute and therefore the trial court had erred in
dismissing a grandfather's petition.94 The Ohio
Court of Appeals, in Epps v. Epps, held that the
trial court did not err in awarding visitation over
the mother's objections as the Ohio statute at issue
was more narrowly drawn then the one invalidat-
ed in the Troxel decision. 95 Further, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld their
statute, as it required a showing that an award of
visitation would not interfere with the parent-child
relationship.96
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v.
Granville did not sound the death knell on grand-
parent visitation statutes. Six states had declared
their statutes unconstitutional prior to the Troxel
decision. Nearly two years after Troxel, only Iowa
and Michigan have found their statutes facially
37
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Many states have limited the applicability of
their statutes by holding them unconstitutional as
applied in specific cases. Other states have found
that their statutes were constitutional because they
were either consistent with Troxel or gave parents
more protection. But it is important to keep in
mind that nearly all litigation of the visitation
statutes has occurred in the last decade. It was only
1993 when the first statute was struck down.
With Troxel having been decided only two years
ago, the state high courts have not heard many
post-Troxel decisions yet. It will take time before
we are able to appreciate the full impact it will
have on this area of the law.
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